



AntiCALVIN On Free Will

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O N F R E E W I L L



BY

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ON FREE WILL.

If, in the history of our human race, there is one question on which more brain toil, more genius, and more terrible agony of body, mind, and soul, has been expended than on any other, it is probably on this question of the freedom of man's will. Is he, on the one hand, merely the creature of circumstances? — a being doomed to an iron fatalism from which there is, and can be, no possible escape? — or is he, on the contrary, a being endowed with a free will? — a power of guiding to some extent his own destinies — and therefore a being amenable to judgment, to punishment, or reward.

Now it may be said, and possibly justly said, that in a discussion so old

as this, a discussion too that has enlisted some of the ablest, and subtlest minds of our race, little now can remain to be advanced. Nevertheless it is to the very daring notion that living men can do better than the wisest of their fore fathers, that human progress is entirely due; and I am therefore, with this reward of daring before my eyes, encouraged to contribute my quota towards the solution of this ancient, and sphinx like riddle; it is for my readers to judge of the success that has been mine.

But before commencing the discussion I would like, first of all to accurately define the meaning of some of the terms we are to use. Old Homer declares that “wide is the range of words, this way and that” (*Iliad*, xx, 249), and a true saying it is. Take any of the sciences of thought — Metaphysics, Philosophy, or Theology — and I think that both history, and experience will show us that nine-tenths of the misunderstandings, misconceptions, and false and heretical thought so prevalent in these sciences is due, simply and entirely, to a loose, and inaccurate phraseology. One thinker expresses an idea by one word, another thinker the same idea by another word; result, mutual misunderstanding: or again, a writer will use a word in one sense, and shortly after uses it in a different sense; result, confusion, and false thought.

Let us then, before attempting to “prove” free will, first of all define what we mean by “proving” a thing, and then go on to see what kind of “proofs” are in this instance valid.

How we may say that “proving” a thing is first knowing a thing, and secondly communicating that knowledge to other persons, and showing how, and why a thing is so.

But again this term “knowledge” is, I think used for two very diverse, and indeed opposite workings of the mind, namely knowledge “a priori,” or deductive, and knowledge “a posteriori,” or inductive. This being as it follows that there are also two kinds of “proofs,” again “a priori,” and “a posteriori,” corresponding to these two classes of knowledge.

To elucidate my meaning. “A priori,” or deductive knowledge, is knowing a thing from its origin to its result—from its “why” to its “how.” It is therefore knowing a thing as it is “in itself,” and is absolute, perfect, and final knowledge.

Thus if you give a mathematician the factors of a sum, he will work it out, and will know “a priori” the result: or to alter the illustration, describe to a mechanician a given arrangement of cog wheels, ratchets,

and pinions, and he knows “a priori” the resultant machine, and what it can accomplish. So too, describe to an astronomer a certain planet or comet, and the laws that govern its motion, and he will trace out for you its future path, and where it will be at a certain time. These then are all illustrations of “a priori” knowledge, a mental operation working from the “data” to its result—from the “why” to the “how”—giving us, I repeat, the knowledge of a thing as it is “in itself,” and therefore perfect, absolute, and final.

Furthermore, I would like to point out, this knowing a thing “a priori” implies an “imaging” it forth in the mind, an “ideal creation,” corresponding to the “Divine Ideals” of Plato, and the Schoolmen, those archetypes of Creation. In other words this “a priori” knowledge is, primarily and principally, the “knowledge” that the Godhead has, imaging forth His Creation. Yet inasmuch as man is in the image of God, he has a portion of this power, and can to some small extent “know” things “a priori” (as in the instances given); or, in other words, can he a Creator, both ideally in his brain, and actually in the external world.

This then is “a priori” knowledge; knowledge, I repeat, perfect, absolute, final, and implying an “ideal creation.”

But the second mental process, to which we also apply the term “knowledge,” is of a totally different type. It is, in fact, the reverse operation to the former, is “a posteriori,” or inductive, as that is “a priori,” or deductive: it is, in short, a blind groping from the “how,” to the “why”—from the manifestation, to the reality as it is “in itself”—or, in philosophical language, from the “phenomenon” to the “noumenon.”

The vast majority of our “knowledge” is of this character, as our “knowledge” of the external world around us, of the various phenomena of life, even our “knowledge” of our Creator, aye! and even of the depths of our own being. This type of “knowledge” is, as you will perceive, capable of degrees, is external, fragmentary, incomplete, and exceedingly apt to mislead. It is, in short, the empirical, sensational, and partial “knowledge” of the creature, as opposed to the ideal, creative, and perfect “knowledge” of the Creator. How corresponding to these two diverse, and opposite types of “knowledge”—“a priori,” and “a posteriori”—there are, it seems to me, also two classes of “proofs,” or manifestations of our knowledge, again “a priori,” and “a posteriori.”

Thus, to return to my previous illustration, the mechanician “images”

forth his machine, and “knows” it “a priori,” and so is able to “prove” it to you, also “a priori,” by “imaging” forth to you the various sequences in the chain of its creation. This is an exact, and perfect “proof,” satisfying the mathematical sense.

On the other hand we have the “a posteriori” proof, showing that a thing is so, *or probably* so, by its consequences.

Thus if we were required to prove the reality of the external world, we would be unable to do so “a priori,” not being its creators, but must proceed to do so “a posteriori,”—or empirically— by pointing to its results —its persistence with us, our constant reliance upon it, and the practical necessity of our so treating it as real.

This class of “proofs” then are, as you will notice, empirical, sensational, and “common sense,” and are only probable in a greater or less degree. They can never, in short, reach absolute and necessary certainty, as the former—or “a priori”—class of proofs do.

Having made this vital distinction between the two types of “knowledge”—“a priori,” and “a posteriori,”—and the resultant two types of “proofs”—again “a priori,” and “a posteriori”,— I will now proceed to inquire which of these two classes of “proofs” are valid for the establishment of the philosophic truth of our free will.

Assuredly not “a priori” proofs, for we are not God, to create ourselves “de novo,” even ideally. Nor are facts, or arguments, drawn from our consciousness, or from the external world, available in this connection; for free will is, as I will show, a primal fact of consciousness, ranking with our consciousness of an external world, and only second to the prime certainty of our own individual existence. To endeavour then to “prove” free will by “a priori” arguments, or corollaries, deduced from external phenomena, would involve us in the absurdity of trying to prove a more certain, by a less certain—a prime fact of consciousness, by the minor facts, or deductions of experience or reason.

The only class then of arguments that are at all available in this case are the “a posteriori” ones of congruous effects. In other words, having first shown “free will” to be a primary fact of consciousness, and therefore not to be denied, we can then go on to make assurance doubly sure by pointing to common every day experience, and the other facts of the case, and showing that the practical workings of our nature are in accordance with this necessary theory of free will.

Having made these preliminary and needful remarks let us now proceed to discuss the various philosophical arguments in the case.

To begin then we may say that the arguments for fatalism, and against any free will in man, may be briefly summed up under three heads, first the “religious” argument, secondly the “scientific” one, and thirdly the appeal to experience, and facts in the observed phenomena of “atavism.”

As to the “religious” argument, it is alleged that our Creator, being Omniscient, must perforce know what our future actions will be: from this it follows that our future actions being foreknown, they must also be inevitable; and if inevitable, then they must have been fore-ordained, or pre-destined by some Almighty power; and Who should that Power be but our Creator Himself?

This then is the argument from the Omniscience of God, and is, it will be noticed, the reasoning underlying not only the Calvanistic fatalism, but also that of Mohammedanism, and of other Eastern systems older still; taking its origin from a Theism that, among all the Infinite Attributes of the Godhead, feels only, and dwells only on His Wisdom, and above all on His Power; a Theism, in fact, closely akin to the monergism of Pantheism.

A very good presentation of this phase of thought is given us in the Rubaiyet of Omar Khayyam (lxxiii), where it is said:

*“With earth’s first clay they did the last man knead
“and there of the last harvest sowed the seed “and the first morning
of creation wrote
“what the last dawn of reckoning shall read”*

But leaving until later the consideration of this “religious” fatalism, let us pass on to the second, and more weighty line of argument (and the one I will therefore first answer), which is of a totally different class, and springs rather from what is known at the present day as a “scientific spirit.”

Men who have studied Nature in her manifold activities point to the world around us, and bid us observe everywhere the reign of uniform laws, and causation. To make a familiar comparison one may liken it to a child’s card house, where the fall of the first card pushes down in turn its companion cards, until the motion has passed through the whole set; this

is not at all a had illustration of what is known as “the law of sequence, and universal causation in Nature,” and of “conservation of force.” Whatever happens, it is said, has been inexorably caused by an occurrence in the past, and inexorably causes in its turn some other event in the future: it follows then that whatever happens, must happen, is, in fact, merely a link in the chain of universal causation,—and that in this chain there is, and can be, no possible break. “Free will!!” exclaims the Necessitarian philosopher, “it is but the mocking shadow of man’s romantic longings, the vain surmisings of his idle regrets; man is but the mere battle ground of contending emotions and desires, the helpless, and hopeless captive of circumstances and events.” Well to this the following “*a posteriori*” arguments may at once be objected. If, in the first place, man’s soul is the “battleground of contending emotions, and desires,” then the very fact of these emotions being contending conclusively shows, I think, that these emotions, like the external phenomena that give rise to them, are outside of the citadel of the will. Surely in no sense can it be said that these external phenomena, and the impressions, and emotions arising from them, are originators—creators—of our will; they are rather coveted things—attractions—to be weighed by our pre-existent will, “pro,” and “con” in making a decision. Emotions “per se” have certainly no concrete, prior, or separate existence; but can only be predicated as being passing phases in the councils of a *pre-existent* volition, or free will: and again, any idea of “contending emotions” in a machine, or automaton is absurd on the face of it.

Still further we can point out that this “romantic longing,” this wish, nay! *the very conception itself* of free will, proves its existence. The very ability man has of conceiving such a thing as “free will”—“volition”—at all, proves that however much he may be dominated by adverse circumstances, yet the utmost that can truthfully be said is that his actions are limited by, not produced by, these circumstances; otherwise his conceptions would never, and could never set against them: for observe, free action is by no means necessary to the existence of free will; an innocent man’s hand may be seized by an assassin, armed with a dagger, and driven to a stranger’s heart; but the forced action in no sense, and in no way, affects the freedom of his will, and consequently his abhorrence, and innocence of the crime.

But we can go even deeper than this, and say that not only is this

conception, and consciousness we possess of free will a strong argument in its favour, but also that it is the *prime* argument in the case.

In the first place it is generally true that our primal intuitions are the basis of all our knowledge; not only our religious principles, and our ethics, but even those things that we look upon as most indubitable—our mathematical science, and even the existence of a material world around us— are all ultimately based on the intuitive, or necessary knowledge of our intellectual nature, plow, as Aristotle well said, “they who reject the testimony of self-evident truth, will find nothing surer on which to build,” and the man therefore who refuses to credit his natural perception of his own free will, and styles it a “self- delusion,” is, in reality, cutting away the ground on which every argument, and every perception of truth must be based.

But more than this: in thus refusing to credit his own perceptions of free will, he is not merely denying necessary truth in general, but is, in particular, suicidally destroying the very platform on which his whole argument rests.

If we go down to the root of the matter we will find, I think, that our conceptions of necessary cause and effect take, in the first place, their origin from our natural intuitions as to our own power of prime origination. I form a certain volition, perform a certain act, and from this act I perceive certain results to follow: from this sequence I deduce by analogy a law of cause and effect in general, and apply it to the world around me; and, if I am a scientist, I call this analogy “the law of sequence, and universal causation.” I furthermore, if I am a thoughtful man, perceive that while I can originate motion, no such power is observable in the material world around me; it can merely transmit, or hand on, motion, and that by reason of its inertia, or deadness, which will not suffer it to either add, or take away, one iota from the sum total committed to it: this fact I then denominate “the law of the conservation of force.” But since the material world cannot originate force, and since both my experience, and my intuitions teach me that force, equally with matter, cannot originate itself, I am therefore led to predicate a Great Primal Cause— a God of all— Who is the Creator, and Upholder of the Universe Around me, and of its manifold activities.

So then from my intuitions as to my power of prime origination, or “free will” spring not only my conceptions of “necessary cause and effect”

in general, but also of a Great Creator of all in particular. In fact our conception of "cause, and effect," as a prominent Agnostic, and Necessitarian philosopher has pointed out, is altogether an anthropomorphic one (as indeed all our conceptions are, and must be), and it has even been denied to be certainly true on those very grounds. It therefore follows, as I have already stated, that the man who adduces "the law of universal causation in Nature" as a reason for denying the truth of our intuitions of free will, is, in reality, cutting from under him the very grounds on which his whole argument is based. And this consideration disposes too of the argument from "the law of the conservation of force;" for any "law of conservation" must, to be intelligible, be based on the primary law of "cause and effect;" or in other words, on the inability, on the one hand, of an effect to be without an adequate cause (as would be the case if the sum total of force were increased); or in the other, of a cause to be without an adequate effect (as would be the case if the sum total of force were diminished). But if we treat our instinctive feeling of free will and origination as a baseless phantasy, on what possible grounds can we predicate such a thing as "cause and effect" at all?

"Arguing in a circle" has always been held to be an utterly inconsequent and delusive act; but the "Necessitarian school" even disprove themselves "in a circle," their argument ending, as I have shown, by denying the very intuitions and axioms upon which it is based!!

This is such a self-evident, and flagrant absurdity that we need hardly call attention to the lesser, yet still vital one, of attempting to confute "a priori" a prime fact of consciousness (namely free will), by the secondary and derived facts of experience and reason (namely the laws of "cause and effect," and of "conservation of force").

In this connection should be noticed the very significant and ominous fact, so clearly, and repeatedly illustrated in history, that those philosophies that begin by denying "free will," logically go on to also deny "free thought," and "self-consciousness," suicidally styling them "the delusive phantasies of a fancied individuality." In short it is undeniably certain, both logically, and historically, that "free will," "free thought," and "self-consciousness of personality" are indissolubly linked together, and are all necessary to one another, and to intellectual sanity.

Taking then, as we must, our intuitions of a free will as valid, we may say we instinctively feel that we, as free spiritual beings, are above, and

outside of, the chain of causes in material Nature: this, I repeat, is a prime fact of consciousness, and must be accepted as a self-evident truth, if we are to have any basis for argument, or knowledge at all.

But to still further enforce this truth, and to assure us (if assurance can be needed!), that we are not deluded by these our primal intuitions, we can point to still other “a posteriori” proofs of our free will, such as the following:

In the first place, not only can we originate motion, but we can also mould, or modify existent phenomena; and again we can also, to some limited extent, apprehend, analyse, and comprehend, the laws of Material Nature; I need hardly point out that this power of comprehension, imperfect as it may be, yet implies a separateness from, and superiority to, the thing comprehended (i.e. Material Nature) in that respect: we become, in fact, to some small extent, Nature’s Gods, by thus exercising our powers of “ideal creation.”

Self-consciousness too, as already noticed, is another phenomenon that points the same way. In its very essence it implies a personality—an “I,” and a “not I,”—and a self-limitation; and so a separateness from, and superiority to, Material Nature; and therefore a freedom from its causation; for a Necessitarianism springing from “universal causation in Nature” can only be predicated of something that is an integral part in the machinery of the Material world; and so far as a thing is separate from Material Nature, so far is it also separate from the chain of causation in Material Nature.

Again we may ask what possible interconnection is there between material laws, and spiritual powers? Gravity, heat, colour, what possible fellowship have they with thought, conscience, or volition? Surely the two classes of phenomena seem absolutely non-related.

And finally we may lay it down as an axiom that a sentient being must perforce possess free will, as without this power thought would be impossible. Above I have used the expression “power of prime origination” as synonymous with “free will,” and rightly so; but yet looking at the matter more minutely we may say that “prime origination” is rather the will in action, and that the ultimate intrinsic note of free will is perhaps more strictly the “power of choice.”

Now if we endeavor to trace the operations of thought, we will, I think, find it to be somewhat as follows: firstly, certain sensations arising from

external phenomena are presented to the preexistent mind, which then proceeds to “think” of them, or in other words to codify, and arrange these sensations, first by an act of *synthesis*, producing experience, and then by an act of *analysis*, producing knowledge (that is, “a posteriori” knowledge); and it is in this codifying, and arranging—this choosing, and shifting the phenomena presented to the mind— that thought essentially consists. Sensations “per se” are not thought (as the “Sensational school” wrongly supposes), but are rather the subjects of thought; the ability for which is, and must be, external, and prior to these sensations. Or to put the thing in a more metaphysical way, before a sensation can be apprehended, and become knowledge, the intellect must read into it previous categories: and if our intellect could not so interpret it, if, in other words, it were possible that the sensation, or thing, as our mind apprehended it, was “nonrelated,” or out of the necessary relations of likeness, and of contrast to other known things, then in such a case it would be, so far as we are concerned, *no thing* at all.

This will explain the well known fact that a man can see (to take one class of sensations) only what his mind allows him to see; and that, with the same identical sense perceptions, a farmer, and a hunter, will view a very different landscape.

“Thought” then consists of, first apprehension, secondly synthesis, and thirdly analysis: it follows then that the “power of choice,” to enable this analysis to be made, is an absolute necessity for thought; an automaton, or even a person temporarily guided by another’s will (such as a hypnotised person is claimed to be), because it, or he, cannot *choose*, cannot therefore *think*. It is therefore true that, as I have stated above, every sentient being must perforce possess free will.

In fact, as an ultimate analysis will, I think, show us, free will is the vital core, not only of thought, but of personality itself. It is, in other words, the prime, and essential note of differentiation from the surrounding universe, the vital, and primal element then of a self-conscious, self-determined, and self-contained individuality. This coincides with what is said above of the vital connection between free will, free thought, and self-consciousness of personality.

But the above arguments, while they show the freedom of our *spiritual* being from the laws of necessity in Material Nature, at the same time also show us that our *material* tabernacle— our body— is subject to the laws

of “universal, and necessary causation” in general, just as it is subject to one of these laws in particular, that namely of “gravitation.” In short we may rightly conclude that in so far as a man is *spiritually* considered, he is free; but in so far as he is *material*, he is predestined; or in other words that while “universal causation” does not *govern*, yet if *circumscribes* him.

This formula of Circumscribed, not governed” will, I think, elucidate, and show us the proper bearing of the puzzling question of “Atavism,” or in other words “inherited peculiarities,” a phenomenon in our highly complex being that is often brought forward as a third argument for Necessitarianism.

Now it is true that no one who studies human nature can shut his eyes to the constantly observed fact that the peculiarities and idiosyncrasies of parents and ancestors are constantly being reproduced in their offspring. Tricks of manner, and modes of thought— predispositions to various faults and vices on the one hand, or to virtues and talents on the other— recur in the same family again and again. How often we see a child reproduce with startling, and well-nigh photographic accuracy the personality of a grandfather, or great grandfather; who has not repeatedly observed this phenomenon, and observing been struck by it? But on the other hand we have also the well-known fact that no one can predict the future of a child: there will be three brothers, sons of the same parents, with the same inherited peculiarities and dispositions, the same training, and the same influences in all respects brought to bear on them, so far as we can see; yet each one of those three lives will be different; how different, until actually lived, who can tell?

In fact similar laws to those which obtain in biology, obtain also here. We have first the law of “the permanence of type,” determining with unswerving rule that like can only produce like, and that animals continue after their kind. But conjoined to this law, and balancing it, is its opposite, and correlative one “Evolution,” or “development,” determining that the type advances, or degrades, becomes better, or worse, according as it is moulded by each individual’s life.

So too in human character; each one of us has at his birth a pre-determined, or inherited nature—body, and disposition— give him; which said nature we proceed to develop into a character, good, or bad, by our daily lives. To apply the imagery of a well-known parable, we may say

that each of us, at his entrance into life, has given into his hands an inheritance of pre-determined “talents”—five, two, or one,—which inheritance we then proceed to augment, or diminish, until death lays us low, and we are called to a solemn reckoning for the use of the treasure committed to our care. In short “Atavism” decides where a man shall start from, it rests ultimately with himself which way he will go; and we are plainly taught that “of him to whom much has been given, much will be required;” or in other words, that our standard of judgment will not be the hard, and fast one of actual deeds, but will rather be a “sliding scale,” in which individual inheritance, opportunities, and comparative results, will be the factors.

In truth a little consideration will show us that this “law of development” must needs be a factor in the problem, or there would be no such thing as human history at all, or a race of human beings such as the present. For, scientifically speaking, it is at least probable that all the human race have sprung from one pair of progenitors; and even were this denied, yet it is absolutely certain that millions of the human family have common ancestors. How had the law of “Atavism” no balancing and correcting law of “development,” such as I have pointed out above, how could we possibly account for the numberless observed peculiarities of disposition, and type ? There are in this world as many differing characters as there are individuals; were the law of Atavism alone true, all these human beings should be as alike as the peas in a pod; and as for human “history,” it would be a misnomer, the story would be as mathematically regular and eventless as the story of the revolutions of a planet!!

So much then for the argument from “Atavism,” a fact of our complex and finite being, and yet one in no way contradicting, or impairing the prime verity of the freedom of our will. To repeat in brief my foregoing conclusions we may say that this “power of choice,” or “free will,” is an essential power of the spiritual Ego; which yet, inasmuch as it works through a material body, is circumscribed (not governed) by the material laws of necessary sequence affecting that body: and furthermore; seeing that our Spirit can comprehend and govern “matter”— be in short, its “god,”— we can, by the due use of our opportunities, so bend and sway Material Mature to our will, both in our bodies and in the external world, as to render practically inappreciable the circumscribing wall of material

laws.

Finally let us consider the first argument for Necessitarianism that I noticed, the one namely that our Creator, being Omniscient, and Almighty, foreknows what our future actions will be which therefore must be inevitable, and predestined by Him.

Yet is not this an idea founded on a misconception arising from words? We give a name, and forthwith proceed to argue from that name!

Speaking with all solemnity and reverence, may we not say that there are things that Omnipotence cannot do, such as make “a round square,” and that because such a thing would be a misnomer— a self-contradiction. To advance Infinity as a reason for performing self-contradictions is absurd; as well might we argue that infinite parallel right lines must include a space, because they are infinite: absurdity multiplied by infinity is certainly not less an absurdity than before; on the contrary, it is “infinitely absurd.”

Now, reverting to our above conclusions as to the free will of man’s spirit, on the one hand, and the sequence of material causation in his body, on the other, we may say that our Creator has an absolutely perfect foreknowledge of the latter. Man even, by his empirical acquaintance with some natural laws, can to some extent foreknow, and predict occurrences in the natural world. But this knowledge, partial, imperfect, and “a posteriori” in man, is absolute, perfect, and “a priori” in the Great Creator, and Originator of all: He Who, not *formed*, but *forms* all Nature, and is its Omnipresent and Omniscient Underlying Reality, does and must have absolute foreknowledge of all the infinite sequences in His Universe.

But granting that man, in his spiritual being, has a free will— a power of choice, and of prime origination— (and as I have shown above, we must acknowledge this as true, or else have no possible base to argue from), then, I say, to state that whatever his free will *may originate* in the future, can be, and is *foreknown*, is a flagrant contradiction in terms, seeing that what *may be* originated in the future is a non entity— is, in other words, not in existence *now*, either actually, or in embryo. It is no contradiction then, but a valid distinction, to say that while Omniscient Wisdom does, and must foreknow, and fore-ordain, in accordance with set laws, man’s bodily nature—his inherited disposition,— yet Omniscience neither knows, nor fore-ordains, his future development

and character; on which, and on which alone, his future judgment will depend. This distinction does justice both to our inherent beliefs in God's government of His world, and to our intuitions of a judgment hereafter, and of right and wrong deeds here; words entirely without meaning were there no such thing as a "free will" in man.

But besides the fact that this argument from Omnipotence springs from an analysis of our own definitions, it is also true, as I have shown above in relation to the argument from "the law of universal causation," that such an argument is itself based **On** the very intuitions it seeks to overthrow. If *my* creations are only fancied deeds, and self-delusions, how can I possibly prove, or even imagine, such a thing as "a Creation" at all; my intuitions being false, all conceptions based on those intuitions must themselves be false. True, there might be, in such a case, a Creator and Ruler, and His Creation; but what possible conception could I form, either of Him, or of a Cosmos that had no possible relation, or semblance to my fancied world of self hallucination? In fact such fatalistic conceptions agree far better with an extreme, mechanical Pantheism, and are not at all congruous to the idea of a Personal God. A loving, all-wise Father, giving to His children personality, and a free will, to enable them to build up their characters, and work out their salvation; that is one conception. A Universe of unvarying laws— "Karma," or "Fates,"— with beings who have for a few brief moments the delusion of personality, and then dissolve in death, like bubbles that float and burst in an illimitable ocean of being; that is another conception, having nothing in common with the previous one, but rather being utterly incompatible, and lying at the opposite pole of thought.

To sum up then we may say that man must *perforce* be allowed to have a free will, circumscribed, it is true, but not governed, by the laws of the Universe, for no other supposition is logically coherent, or possible. As "a posteriori" proofs (and the only ones valid) of this, not only have we the positive arguments derived from the phenomena of self-consciousness, of personality, and of thought, etc., and with which the "law of Atavism" is perfectly congruous, but we have also the conclusive fact that Scientific Necessitarianism can only advance for itself arguments that are themselves founded on the very ideas, and instincts it seeks to overthrow; while a fatalism based on a religious definition is equally suicidal; and is besides far more coherent with a mechanical, impersonal, and illogical

Pantheism, than with the Heavenly Father of Christianity, or even the Personal God of Theism, and Natural Religion.

